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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 
_____________________ 
 
NO 15-CV-1478 (JFB) (GRB) 
_____________________ 
 
BELLAVIA BLATT & CROSSETT, P.C., 
 
        PLAINTIFF, 
          
VERSUS 
 
KEL & PARTNERS LLC D/B/A KEL & PARTNERS & KEL KELLY,  
 
        DEFENDANTS. 
___________________ 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
December 16, 2015 
___________________   
 
JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge: 
 
 Plaintiff Bellavia Blatt & Crossett, P.C. 
(“plaintiff”) brings this action in diversity 
against defendants Kel & Partners LLC d/b/a 
Kel & Partners and Kel Kelly (“Kelly”) 
(collectively, “defendants”), asserting a 
claim of defamation under New York state 
common law. Specifically, plaintiff alleges 
that defendants defamed plaintiff by posting 
a comment to an Automotive News webpage.    
 
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s 
cause of action for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6). At oral argument, this 
Court notified the parties that it was 
converting the motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 
motion for summary judgment to consider 
certain evidence from the internet site 
submitted by defendants. Plaintiff’s counsel 
advised the Court that plaintiff did not wish 
to conduct any discovery on that issue or 
submit any evidence. For the reasons set forth 
below, defendants’ motion is granted in its 
entirety and the case is dismissed.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Facts 
For purposes of the motion for summary 
judgment, the Court has taken the facts 
described below from the complaint 
(“Compl.”) and from the exhibits submitted 
in connection with the pending motion.  
Upon consideration of a motion for summary 
judgment, the Court construes the facts in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-
moving party. See Capobianco v. City of 
N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).  
Plaintiff is a law firm that represents 
franchised or licensed automobile and marine 
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dealerships in an assortment of legal matters. 
(Compl. ¶ 7.) Defendant Kel & Partners LLC 
is a public relations firm and defendant Kel 
Kelly is a manager of the firm. (Compl. ¶¶ 
12-13.) TrueCar, Inc. is a corporation that 
assists consumers in purchasing automobiles. 
(Compl. ¶ 14.) Kel & Partners was retained 
by TrueCar to provide public relations 
services. (Compl. ¶ 16.)  
On or about March 9, 2015, plaintiff, on 
behalf of 117 of its automotive dealership 
clients, commenced a lawsuit against 
TrueCar in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York 
entitled Dependable Sales and Services, Inc. 
et al v. True Car, Inc., 15-CV-1742 (“True 
Car lawsuit”). (Compl. ¶ 20.) The True Car 
lawsuit asserted claims for, inter alia, false 
advertising and unfair competition under 
federal and state law. (Compl. ¶ 21.)  
On or about March 9, 2015, the date that 
the True Car lawsuit was filed, an industry 
publication entitled Automotive News posted 
an article describing and summarizing the 
lawsuit. (Compl. ¶ 23.) At the bottom of the 
article, Automotive News wrote: “Have an 
opinion about this story? Click here to submit 
a Letter to the Editor, and we may publish it 
in print. Or submit an online comment 
below.” (Def.’s Mem. Ex. A, Article and 
Comment Thread, at 6.) At the time that the 
motion was filed, 117 comments were 
submitted online in response to the story. 
(Id.) On March 10, 2015, Kelly posted the 
following comment:  
It is sadly becoming true that in order 
to be genuinely successful in modern 
business you must, at some point, 
become the target of fraudulent 
litigation. It’s a reality that anyone in 
America can sue for any reason. The 
law firm behind this suit has a 
reputation for making a living by 
opportunistically attempting to sue 
others. Word of the street is they have 
been attempting to induce dealers to 
join this lawsuit for quite some time 
with the misleading promise of 
millions in reward. Additionally what 
is being whispered throughout the auto 
industry is that participating dealers 
must pay thousands of dollars to 
participate and the claims are just a 
fishing exercise. . . .  
(Compl. ¶ 25.)  
     Others replied to Kelly’s post, both 
positively and negatively, and individuals 
voiced a variety of opinions regarding the 
automotive industry and the lawsuit, among 
other topics. (Ex. A, at 6-21.)  
B. Procedural History 
On March 20, 2015, plaintiff filed the 
instant action. Defendants filed their motion 
to dismiss on August 3, 2015. Plaintiff filed 
its response on October 2, 2015, and 
defendants filed their reply on October 23, 
2015. Oral argument was held on November 
9, 2015.  
Defendants’ submissions on the motion 
to dismiss attached several exhibits including 
the entire Automotive News article and 
accompanying comment thread.  In its 
opposition brief, plaintiff argued that “[t]he 
statements of other posters may not be 
considered by the Court in the context of this 
motion to dismiss, and should be 
disregarded.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 10.) In response, 
defendants cited several cases, including 
Brahms v. Carver, 33 F. Supp. 3d 192 
(E.D.N.Y. 2014), for the proposition that 
“courts deciding motions to dismiss based on 
statements made in Internet debates routinely 
examine the comments made by non-party 
participants in that debate.” (Def.’s Reply at 
7.) The Court agrees with defendants that “[a] 
court may consider on a Rule 12(b) motion, 
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in addition to the pleading itself, documents 
that are annexed to or referenced in the 
complaint [and] documents that the plaintiff 
relied on in bringing suit.” Brahms, 33 F. 
Supp. 3d at 197 (citing Chambers v. Time 
Warner, 282 F.3d 147, 152-153 (2d Cir. 
2002)); see also Holowecki v. Fed. Express 
Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 565-66 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“‘[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to 
the complaint or incorporate by reference a 
[document] upon which it solely relies and 
which is integral to the complaint, the court 
may nevertheless take the document into 
consideration in deciding the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, without converting the 
proceeding to one for summary judgment.’”) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Int'l 
Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)). However, 
in an abundance of caution, at oral argument, 
the Court gave plaintiff notice that it was 
converting the motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgement under Rule 
56 so that the Court could consider the 
context and surrounding circumstances of the 
Automotive News website in analyzing the 
defamation claim. 
When materials are submitted on a 
motion to dismiss that are outside of the 
pleadings, the Court has discretion to either 
exclude these materials or convert the motion 
to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment.   See Chambers v. Time Warner, 
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2003); see 
also Carione v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 
2d 186, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Federal 
courts have ‘complete discretion to determine 
whether or not to accept the submission of 
any material beyond the pleadings’ offered in 
conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and 
thus complete discretion in determining 
whether to convert the motion to one for 
summary judgment; ‘this discretion generally 
will be exercised on the basis of the district 
court’s determination of whether or not the 
proffered material, and the resulting 
conversion from the Rule 12(b)(6) to the Rule 
56 procedure, is likely to facilitate the 
disposition of the action.’” (quoting 5C 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 1366 
(3d ed. 2004))).  If the Court decides to 
convert the motion to dismiss into a motion 
for summary judgment, the non-moving 
party must be given a “reasonable 
opportunity to meet facts outside the 
pleadings.” In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 
F.2d 288, 295 (2d Cir. 1985). 
At oral argument, after notifying the 
parties that it was converting the motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgement, plaintiff was given the 
opportunity to introduce evidence and/or 
undertake limited discovery on the issue, 
such as taking a deposition regarding the 
authenticity of the Automotive News website 
postings; plaintiff declined to do so on the 
record at oral argument. The Court has fully 
considered the parties’ submissions.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
 
The standard for summary judgment is 
well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a motion 
for summary judgment only if “the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a); see also Gonzalez v. City of 
Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 
2013). The moving party bears the burden of 
showing that he is entitled to summary 
judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 
F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). “A party asserting 
that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed 
must support the assertion by: (A) citing to 
particular parts of materials in the record, 
including depositions, documents, 
electronically stored information, affidavits 
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or declarations, stipulations (including those 
made for purposes of the motion only), 
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 
materials; or (B) showing that the materials 
cited do not establish the absence or presence 
of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 
cannot produce admissible evidence to 
support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 
The court “‘is not to weigh the evidence but 
is instead required to view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment, to draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of that party, and to 
eschew credibility assessments.’” Amnesty 
Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 
122 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 
101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996)); see 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986) (summary judgment is 
unwarranted if “the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party”). 
 
Once the moving party has met its 
burden, the opposing party “‘must do more 
than simply show that there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to the material 
facts . . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come 
forward with specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial.’” Caldarola v. 
Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)). As the 
Supreme Court stated in Anderson, “[i]f the 
evidence is merely colorable, or is not 
significantly probative, summary judgment 
may be granted.” 477 U.S. at 249-50 
(citations omitted). Indeed, “the mere 
existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties alone will not defeat an 
otherwise properly supported motion for 
summary judgment.” Id. at 247-48 (emphasis 
in original). Thus, the nonmoving party may 
not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or 
denials but must set forth “‘concrete 
particulars’” showing that a trial is needed. 
R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 
F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting SEC v. 
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 
(2d Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, it is insufficient 
for a party opposing summary judgment 
“‘merely to assert a conclusion without 
supplying supporting arguments or facts.’” 
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & 
Co.-Conn., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Research Automation Corp., 585 
F.2d at 33). 
 
B. Application 
 
An action for defamation that is expressed 
in writing or print is the common law cause 
of action of libel. See Church of Scientology 
Int'l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 
2001). The elements of libel under New York 
law are: (1) a false and defamatory statement 
of fact concerning the plaintiff; (2) that was 
published by the defendant to a third party; 
(3) due to the defendant’s negligence (or 
actual malice, depending on the status of the 
person libeled); and (4) special damages or 
“per se actionability.” Celle v. Filipino 
Reporter Enters., 209 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 
As the Second Circuit has repeatedly 
confirmed, “New York law absolutely 
protects statements of pure opinion, such that 
they can never be defamatory.”  Kirch v. 
Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 402 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Defendants argue that the 
challenged statements are opinions, not 
susceptible of defamatory meaning. As set 
forth below, the Court agrees with defendants 
and finds as a matter of law that Kelly’s 
statements were nonactionable opinions.   
 
“Categorizing a defendant’s statements as 
either fact or opinion . . . is often not an easy 
task.  As one commentator has noted, ‘No 
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area of modern libel law can be murkier than 
the cavernous depths of this inquiry.’” Levin 
v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Sanford, Libel and Privacy § 5.1 
(Supp. 1997)).  Nevertheless, the “burden 
rests with the plaintiff to establish that in the 
context of the entire communication a 
disputed statement is not protected opinion.”  
Celle, 209 F.3d at 179. 
 
“As an initial matter, the inquiry into 
whether a statement should be viewed as one 
of fact or one of opinion must be made from 
the perspective of an ordinary reader of the 
statement.”  Mr. Chow of N.Y. v. Ste. Jour 
Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see 
also Dworin v. Deutsch, No. 06 Civ. 13265 
(PKC), 2008 WL 508019, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 2008) (“The question is one of law 
for the court and one which must be answered 
on the basis of what the average person 
hearing or reading the communication would 
take it to mean.”) (citation and quotation 
marks omitted); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. 
v. Weiss, No. 06-CV-6569, 2008 WL 731024, 
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2008) (“The 
dispositive inquiry in this regard is whether a 
reasonable listener . . . could have concluded 
that [the defendant] was conveying facts 
about the plaintiff.”) (alteration in original) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  
 
Moreover, the Second Circuit has 
emphasized that courts should not consider 
the statement in question in isolation, but 
must analyze statements “in the context of the 
entire communication and of the 
circumstances in which they were . . . written. 
. . .”  Celle, 209 F.3d at 178 (quoting 
Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 288 
(N.Y. 1986)); see also Flamm v. Am. Assoc. 
of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 
2000) (“Since Steinhilber, the Court of 
Appeals of New York has consistently 
focused its analysis on the overall context in 
which the complained-of assertions were 
made.”); see also Dworin, 2008 WL 508019, 
at *4 (“‘[I]n distinguishing between 
actionable factual assertions and 
nonactionable opinion, the courts must 
consider the content of the communication as 
a whole, as well as its tone and apparent 
purpose.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46, 51 (N.Y. 
1995)).  
 
In particular, although the Second Circuit 
has emphasized that courts should “eschew 
any attempt . . . to reduce the problem of 
distinguishing fact from opinion to a rigid set 
of criteria which can be universally applied,”  
Celle, 209 F.3d at 179 (citation and quotation 
marks omitted); see also Jewell v. N.Y. Post, 
23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(“Application of these three factors is not 
rigid and mechanical, and no single factor is 
dispositive.”), the Second Circuit has set 
forth the following factors to guide the 
Court’s inquiry: 
 
(1) an assessment of whether the 
specific language in issue has a precise 
meaning which is readily understood or 
whether it is indefinite and ambiguous; 
(2) a determination of whether the 
statement is capable of being 
objectively characterized as true or 
false; (3) an examination of the full 
context of the communication in which 
the statement appears; and (4) a 
consideration of the broader social 
context or setting surrounding the 
communication including the existence 
of any applicable customs or 
conventions which might signal to 
readers or listeners that what is being 
read or heard is likely to be opinion. 
 
Kirch, 449 F.3d at 403 n.7 (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
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In applying these factors in various 
contexts, the Second Circuit and district 
courts therein have further noted certain 
specific characteristics that distinguish fact 
from opinion.  One such distinction relates to 
certain rhetorical “indicators” that the writer 
or speaker is expressing an opinion.  For 
instance, “the use of ‘appeared to be,’ ‘might 
well be,’ ‘could well happen,’ and ‘should 
be’ . . . signal presumptions and predictions 
rather than facts.”  Flamm, 201 F.3d at 154 
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see 
also Levin, 119 F.3d at 197 (“When the 
defendant’s statements, read in context, are 
readily understood as conjecture, hypothesis, 
or speculation, this signals the reader that 
what is said is opinion, and not fact.”); 
Dworin, 2008 WL 508019, at *5 (“Deutsch 
gives numerous indicators – e.g., ‘it seemed 
to me . . . ,’ ‘he didn’t seem . . . ’ – which 
signal to readers . . . that what is being read . 
. . is likely to be opinion, not fact.”) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, “an 
opinion may be offered with such excessive 
language that a reasonable audience may not 
fairly conclude that the opinion has any basis 
in fact,” such as the “type of speech often 
characterized as rhetorical hyperbole, 
parody, loose, or figurative.”  Treppel v. 
Biovail Corp., No. 03 Civ. 3002, 2004 WL 
2339759, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2004) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted) 
(collecting cases).  
 
Examining the specific language used in 
this case makes clear that Kelly’s statements 
were rhetorical opinions rather than facts.  
Kelly’s statement is full of qualifiers – such 
as “reputation,” “word of the street” and 
“whispered” – which make clear that her 
statement is one of opinion. See 600 W. 115th 
St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 143 
(N.Y. 1992) (finding use of “colloquial and 
loose term[ ] ‘smells of’ . . . by its nature 
conveys to listeners that [the defendant] has 
no hard facts, only generalized suspicions”); 
Vengroff v. Coyle, 647 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding that “given 
the use of the words ‘apparently,’ ‘rumored,’ 
and ‘reportedly’ in the letter, a reasonable 
reader would understand the statements made 
about the plaintiffs ‘as mere allegations to be 
investigated rather than as facts’”) (quoting 
Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46, 53 (N.Y. 
1995) (emphasis in original)). 
 
Although plaintiff argues Kelly’s use of 
the word “fraudulent” conveys that it “was 
being offered as a fact,” (Pl.’s Opp. at 7-8), 
as defendants note, courts have found that use 
of the word “fraud” can be offered as a 
statement of opinion rather than as a factual 
declaration. See 600 W. 115th St. Corp, 80 
N.Y.2d at 143 (finding statement that “the 
lease and proposition . . . is as fraudulent as 
you can get and it smells of bribery and 
corruption” would be understood as opinion 
given defendant’s choice of “colloquial and 
loose terms ‘smells of’ and ‘fraudulent as you 
can get’” as well as overall nature of remarks 
made at the hearing); Silvercorp Metals Inc. 
v. Anthion Mgmt. LLC, 959 N.Y.S.2d 92, 
2012 WL 3569952, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2012) (finding accusation of “massive 
accounting fraud” would be understood as 
opinion where letter indicates it is an 
expression of the author’s belief and that the 
author was self-interested); Penn Warranty 
Corp v. DiGiovanni, 810 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (finding allegations of 
fraud were opinion where the context of the 
website made clear that defendant was a 
“disgruntled consumer and that his 
statements reflect his personal opinion based 
upon his personal dealing with plaintiff”); cf.  
Trustco Bank of New York v. Capital 
Newspaper Div. of Hearst Corp., 624 
N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
(finding that use of the word extortion was 
not actionable because “[d]epending on the 
context in which it is used, such an accusation 
can be understood as mere rhetorical 
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hyperbole or a vigorous epithet, which is not 
actionable”) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted); Konig v. CSC Holdings, LLC, 977 
N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) 
(finding that “given the context in which the 
challenged statements were made, on an 
Internet blog during a sharply contested 
election, a reasonable reader would have 
believed that the generalized reference to 
‘downright criminal actions’ in a post entitled 
‘Would You Buy A Used Car From These 
Men?’ was merely conveying opinion, and 
was not a factual accusation of criminal 
conduct”). Similarly, here, the surrounding 
circumstances, such as the qualifiers 
throughout Kelly’s statement, make clear that 
use of the word “fraudulent” conveys Kelly’s 
opinion.  
 
Further, “[i]n addition to considering the 
immediate context in which the disputed 
words appear, the courts are required to take 
into consideration the larger context in which 
the statements were published, including the 
nature of the particular forum.” Brian, 87 
N.Y.2d at 51. New York courts have 
consistently protected statements made in 
online forums as statements of opinion rather 
than fact. See, e.g., Sandals Resorts Int’l Ltd. 
v. Google, Inc., 925 N.Y.S.2d 407, 415-16 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (noting that “[t]he 
culture of Internet communications, as 
distinct from that of print media such as 
newspapers and magazines, has been 
characterized as encouraging a free-
wheeling, anything-goes writing style” and 
                                                 
1 Additionally, to the extent that the online forum at 
the end of the article is considered an electronic 
version of a letter to the editor because it was prompted 
as an alterative to submitting a formal Letter to the 
Editor, (see Ex. A, at 6), courts have routinely 
protected statements made in letters to the editor or 
opinion portions of a news source as nonactionable 
opinions. See, e.g., Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 53 (“[T]he 
common expectation is that the columns and articles 
published on a newspaper’s Op Ed sections will 
represent the viewpoints of their authors and, as such, 
that readers “give less credence to allegedly 
defamatory remarks published on the Internet 
than to similar remarks made in other 
contexts”); Brahams v. Carter, 33 F. Supp. 
3d 192, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding 
statement was nonactionable opinion where it 
was “made on an internet forum where 
people typically solicit and express 
opinions”); Biro v. Conde Nast, No. 11-CV-
4442 JPO, 2014 WL 4851901, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (noting that 
determination that plaintiff failed to state a 
defamation claim was “buttressed by the 
context of the publications in question: an 
online website that was essentially a blog”); 
Versaci v. Richie, 815 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006)  (finding statement 
made on “Internet public message board, 
which, as characterized even by plaintiff, is a 
forum where people air concerns about any 
matter” was opinion). Like the circumstances 
in Sandals, Brahams, Biro, and Versaci, here, 
Kelly made statements in an internet 
comment section in response to an article that 
invited readers to post their comments if they 
had an opinion about the story, (see Ex. A, at 
6), further supporting the notion that Kelly’s 
statements were ones of opinion.1   
 
Obviously, these aforementioned cases do 
not stand for the proposition that no 
comments posted on an online forum can 
ever be found to be defamatory. If the 
comments were based on undisclosed facts, 
such comments could certainly be 
defamatory. See Steinhiber v. Alphonse, 68 
contain considerable hyperbole, speculation, 
diversified forms of expression and opinion. Thus, the 
‘broader context’ in which [the article] was published 
provided some signals to the reader that its contents 
were expressions of opinion.”); Immuno AG. v. Moor-
Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 253 (N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he 
common expectation of a letter to the editor is not that 
it will serve as a vehicle for the rigorous and 
comprehensive presentation of factual matter but as 
one principally for the expression of individual 
opinion.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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N.Y.2d 283, 289 (N.Y. 1986) (“When, 
however, the statement of opinion implies 
that it is based upon facts which justify the 
opinion but are unknown to those reading or 
hearing it, it is a ‘mixed opinion’ and is 
actionable.”) However, to the extent that 
plaintiff argues that Kelly’s comments were 
based on undisclosed facts, the posting itself 
does not bear that out. Although Kelly does 
not specifically confine her comments to 
responding to information disclosed in the 
Automotive News article, she makes clear that 
any alternative basis for her comments is 
founded in rumor. She writes that “[t]he 
lawfirm behind this suit has a reputation for 
making a living by opportunistically 
attempting to sue others”; “[w]ord of the 
street is they have been attempting to induce 
dealers to join this suit for quite some time 
with the misleading promise of millions in 
reward”; and “what is being whispered 
throughout the auto industry is that 
participating dealers must pay thousands of 
dollars to participate and the claims are just a 
fishing exercise.”  (Ex. A, at 13) (emphases 
added). No reasonable reader would 
understand Kelly’s claims to be based on 
undisclosed facts when she makes clear that 
they are based on rumors. See Vengroff, 647 
N.Y.S.2d at 531 (finding that reasonable 
reader would understand use of the words 
“apparently,” “rumored,” and “reportedly” 
rendered the statements “‘mere allegations to 
be investigated rather than as facts’”) 
(quoting Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 53 (emphasis in 
original)); Varrenti v. Gannett Co., Inc., 929 
N.Y.S.2d 671, 677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) 
(finding comments were nonactionable 
opinions where they were “based on rumors 
that the anonymous posters heard around [the 
town]”). Accordingly, because Kelly’s 
statements were made on an online forum 
where individuals are expected to express 
opinions and she made clear that her 
comments were merely stating her opinions, 
a reasonable reader would understand Kelly’s 
comments as allegations or opinions rather 
than comments based on undisclosed facts. 
 
Additionally, the context of the forum 
where the statements were made confirms 
that the readers understood the comments 
posted to be opinions. The comments were 
prompted by Automotive News website, 
which stated at the end of the article: “Have 
an opinion about this story? Click here to 
submit a Letter to the Editor, and we may 
publish it in print. Or submit an online 
comment below.” (Ex. A, at 6.) (emphasis 
added). Further, the nature of the comments 
posted by other participants indicates that the 
contributors understood the language posted 
to be opinions. See, e.g., id. at 21 (“[I]n my 
opinion, you are spot on”); id. at 20 (“The 
whole idea [of the forum] is to encourage 
opinions without fear of retribution.”); id. at 
18 (“While I respect your opinion and might 
take your good counsel . . . .”).  
 
Moreover, where circumstances 
surrounding an allegedly defamatory 
statement indicate that the person making the 
statement has a special interest in the matter, 
courts have routinely held that a reasonable 
observer would understand such a statement 
to be one of opinion, rather than fact. See 
Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 53 (holding statements in 
article were nonactionable opinion where 
author disclosed that he had been the attorney 
for a company at issue “thereby signaling that 
he was not a disinterested observer”); 
Silvercorp Metals Inc., 2012 WL 3569952, at 
*9 (“The documents themselves reveal the 
disclosure of the author’s self interest . . . . 
Such motive . . . indicates to the reader that 
the author is expressing his opinion.”) In 
connection with Kelly’s allegedly 
defamatory post, other individuals 
challenged her comments and claimed that 
she was biased due to her past work for 
TrueCar. See Ex. A, at 13 (“It seems clear that 
you, Kel Kelly, work for TrueCar.”); id. at 14 
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(“[Y]ou confessed below to being TrueCar’s 
PR firm . . . ‘I love companies who elevate an 
industry . . .’ or did you mean ‘elevate my 
bank account.’”) Such comments pointing 
out that readers were aware of Kelly’s self-
interest further establish that her comments 
were understood as opinions, not fact. 
 
Accordingly, because the specific 
language used and the context of the online 
forum where the statements were posted 
make clear that Kelly’s statements were 
opinions rather than statements of fact, they 
are not actionable and thus, summary 
judgment must be granted for defendants.2  
 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
   
For the foregoing reasons, the Court 
grants defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment. The Clerk of the Court shall enter 
judgment accordingly.   
 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 
  ________________________ 
  JOSEPH F. BIANCO 
  United States District Judge 
 
Dated: December 16, 2015 
 Central Islip, NY 
 
 
 
*** 
Plaintiff is represented by Shaun Malone of 
Bellavia Blatt & Crossett, P.C., 200 Old 
Country Road, Suite 400, Mineola, NY 
11501. Defendants are represented by 
                                                 
2 Because the Court has determined that the statements 
at issue are nonactionable opinion, it need not consider 
defendants’ alternative arguments that plaintiff is a 
limited purpose public figure and has failed to 
Michael Tremonte and Erica Wolff of Sher 
Tremonte LLP, 80 Broad Street, 13th Floor, 
New York, NY 10004.  
 
 
 
 
 
plausibly allege that defendants acted with actual 
malice, or that the complaint fails to state a claim 
against defendant Kel & Partners.  
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